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New Hampshire v. Massachusetts:
Taxation Without Representation?
By Richard D. Pomp

Richard D. Pomp examines what may be the most closely watched
SALT case this year: New Hampshire v. Massachusetts.
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eaders of this Journal are well aware of New Hampshire’s pending motion
in the U.S. Supreme Court for leave to file its bill of complaint against
Massachusetts.1 At the end of January, the Court invited the Acting
Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States.2 A
response is likely to await the President’s appointment of the new Solicitor General.
The issue in that case is whether Massachusetts may constitutionally subject nonresidents to its state income tax when they perform services outside the state that
were formerly provided in the state.3 Does the taxing sovereignty of Massachusetts
extend to nonresidents working outside that state, a telecommuter, just because
they once worked in the state?4 Some might describe this as “nexus on steroids.”
That nonresidents who earn their income within a state can be taxed by it is
uncontroverted. Cases under the Due Process Clause,5 the Commerce Clause,
and the Privileges and Immunities Clause make this clear.6 Put simply, the state
of source can tax a nonresident’s income earned in that state or derived from
sources in that state.7
This essay deals with a more fundamental question. As a jurisprudential question, why can the source state tax a nonresident’s income from sources in that
state? After all, nonresidents cannot vote in the source state so does not a tax on
their income violate what the country fought for in the American Revolution,
“No Taxation Without Representation?”
The answer partly lies in the prohibition of a state tax that discriminates against
interstate commerce.8 As long as the source state’s income tax cannot discriminate
against nonresidents, they must be treated the same as residents. Consequently,
as residents pursue their self-interest in ensuring that the rates of tax and the
rules for defining the income tax base are acceptable, they are simultaneously
protecting the interests of the nonresidents. Provided the rates and rules are
the same for both residents and nonresidents—which constitutionally they
must be—the interests of the residents protect the interests of the nonresidents.
Nonresidents may not vote, but the residents serve as their proxies. When the
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residents vote on how much income tax they are willing
to bear, they are also voting on behalf of, and thereby
protecting, nonresidents.
This safeguard, however, breaks down when it comes
to issues of jurisdiction, like nexus, which is at the heart
of New Hampshire’s motion. Now the interests of the
residents and nonresidents conflict. The residents are taxed
on their worldwide income, so issues of nexus are not their
immediate concern. Nonetheless, they may not be totally
indifferent to jurisdictional issues because the more taxes
that can be raised from nonresidents who do not vote, the
less the legislature will have to raise from residents, who
do vote. Legislators share this same perspective. Expansive
and aggressive views of nexus serve the interests of
residents—not those of nonresidents.

Does the taxing sovereignty
of Massachusetts extend to
nonresidents working outside that
state, a telecommuter, just because
they once worked in the state? Some
might describe this as “nexus on
steroids.”

The previous convergence of interests over rates and the
tax base breaks down over issues of jurisdiction. The only
safeguards that nonresidents have are the courts (and less
likely to act—the Congress).9 And time is of the essence
to resolve these issues as other states have rules like those
of Massachusetts and more can be expected to follow suit
to fill in deficits by taxing nonvoters.10

New Hampshire is asking the Supreme Court to hear
its case under the original jurisdiction clause of the U.S.
Constitution. The Constitution includes within the
Court’s original jurisdiction “all Cases … in which a State
shall be Party.”11 This jurisdiction has been interpreted
as discretionary.12 The Court has exercised its discretion
“most frequently” to consider disputes “sounding in
sovereignty and property, such as those between states in
controversies concerning boundaries, and the manner of
use of the waters of interstate lakes and rivers.”13
New Hampshire v. Massachusetts is such a case. Nexus
involves issues of sovereignty of the type of the Court
has heard under its original jurisdiction. A “tax base” is
a resource like that of a lake or river. The more one state
draws down that resource, the less that is available for other
states to tap, especially the state of residency.
Another case the Supreme Court heard under its original jurisdiction powers involved the right of Virginia to
withdraw water from a river to the detriment of Maryland
residents.14 New Hampshire would view a similar issue
as being raised in its motion: does Massachusetts have
the right to withdraw financial resources from New
Hampshire residents to their state’s detriment?
The normal political safeguards are missing in the case
of boundary disputes and the use of natural resources, and
this has required the Court’s intervention. These political
safeguards are also missing when Massachusetts asserts
the right to tax nonresidents whose interests are not being
protected by Massachusetts voters.
Just the way South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc,15 modernized the rules on the interstate collection of sales and use
taxes, New Hampshire’s motion invites the Court to do
the same for personal income taxes. Indeed, the substantial increase in remote work and telecommuting is just
another manifestation of how the digital age is challenging
longstanding jurisdictional norms, exactly what the Court
confronted—and resolved—in Wayfair.
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Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, New
Hampshire v. Massachusetts, No. 22O154 (U.S.
Oct. 19, 2020).
New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, 141 SCt 1262
(2021).
For a superb analysis of the issues, see Brief of
Professor Edward A. Zelinsky as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave, New
Hampshire v. Massachusetts, No. 22O154 (U.S.
Dec. 10, 2020) (hereinafter “Amicus Brief ”).
Professor Zelinsky has more than an academic
interest in the matter. See Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals
Tribunal, 1 NY3d 85 (2003), cert. denied 541 US
1009 (2004). He states the issue before the
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Court rather colorfully: “Can a state leap over
its border to tax a nonresident remote worker
who never sets foot in the taxing state?” Amicus
Brief at 2.
830 CMR 62.5A.3. The regulation applies, inter
alia, to any work arrangement in which an
employee who performed services at a location
in Massachusetts prior to the Massachusetts
COVID-19 state of emergency performs such services for the employer from a location outside
Massachusetts during a period in which [the
regulation] is in effect.
Under the Due Process Clause, a state “generally may tax only income earned within” it.

6

Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 US
450, 463 n. 11 (1995); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 US
37, 57 (1920) (a state’s taxing power over nonresidents extends only to the “property owned
within the State and their business, trade, or
profession carried on therein, and the tax is
only on such income as is derived from those
sources”); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252
US 60, 75 (1920) (a state can tax “the incomes of
non-residents arising from any business, trade,
profession, or occupation carried on within its
borders … ”).
MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue,
553 US 16, 24 (2008) (“The Commerce Clause
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forbids the States to levy … unfairly apportioned
taxation”); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
430 US 274, 287 (1977) (state tax must be “fairly
apportioned” to the taxing state); Okla. Tax
Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 US 175, 207 (1995)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“reaffirm[ing] the Central
Greyhound principle” of apportionment); Central
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 US 653,
663 (1948) (“gross receipts” tax must be “fairly
apportioned” to business done in New York);
Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne,
575 US 542, 588 (2015) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting)
(it is well established that states may generally
“tax nonresidents on ‘income earned within the
[sovereign’s] jurisdiction’”) (quoting Oklahoma
Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 US 450,
463, n. 11 (1995)); Richard D. Pomp, State and
Local Taxation, 9th ed. 2019, Ch. 4 (Privileges and
Immunities Clause).
The state of residency can tax the worldwide
income of its residents. Lawrence v. State Tax
Comm’n of Mississippi, 286 US 276, 279 (1932)
(states are generally “unrestricted in their power
to tax those domiciled within them … ”).
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 US 274,
287 (1977) (state tax must not “discriminate[]
against interstate commerce”).
Congress is the best-suited institution to develop
a systemic solution to the taxation of nonresidents by source jurisdictions, but presumably it
will not act before the Supreme Court decides
whether to hear the case. If the Court hears
the motion and endorses New Hampshire’s
views, thus reinforcing the status quo ante,
Congress is unlikely to intervene. A decision for
Massachusetts, on the other hand, is more likely
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to mobilize telecommuters, their employers, and
their states of residency, which will lose revenue
by granting a credit for the source state’s income
tax. If the Court rejects the motion, there would
be little pressure on the Biden administration to
act, which already has a full federal tax reform
agenda. To be sure, bills predating the Biden
administration have been introduced to prohibit
the taxation of services performed outside a
jurisdiction that is attempting to assert source
jurisdiction. Some of these bills reflected the
efforts of Professor Zelinsky, but none has had
any traction. See Amicus Brief, at 21 n. 22.
10
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Nebraska,
New York, and Pennsylvania each have similar provisions under their “convenience of
the employer approach,” which should be
irrelevant when there is no office in the taxing state to which the taxpayer can return.
Lauren Loricchio, Uniformity Needed in State
Teleworking Guidance, Practitioners Say, Tax
Notes State (Jan. 25, 2021). Connecticut’s convenience of the employer test applies only to
non-resident taxpayers whose “state of domicile
uses a similar test.” Conn. Gen. Stat. §12-711(b)
(3). These states had adopted their rules before
Massachusetts.
		Massachusetts, inter alia, argues that the nonresidents receive benefits from Massachusetts
notwithstanding that they are not working
within the state. Brief in Opposition to Motion
for Leave to File Complaint, New Hampshire v.
Massachusetts, No. 22O154 (US Dec. 11, 2020), at
30–31. The Massachusetts tax, however, would
fail the external consistency test under the
fair apportionment prong of Commerce Clause
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analysis. “External consistency … looks to the
economic justification for the state’s claim upon
the value taxed, to discover whether a state’s
tax reaches beyond that portion of value that is
fairly attributable to economic activity within the
taxing state.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson
Line, Inc., 514 US 175, 185 (emphasis added) (1995).
No matter how Massachusetts tries to justify its
tax on a person who performed no services in
the state, the simple truth is that the nonresident
was not performing any economic activity in the
state that could justify a tax. Its approach would
eviscerate the doctrine and leave it toothless.
U.S. Const. Art. III, §2, Cl. 2.
Since the First Judiciary Act, Congress has
provided by statute that the Supreme Court
has “original and exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies between two or more States.” 28
USC 1251(a); see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §13,
7 1 Stat. 80-81; see also Stephen M. Shapiro et
al., Supreme Court Practice §10.1, at 618–621
(10th ed. 2013). The Court has “interpreted the
Constitution and [Section] 1251(a) as making
[its] original jurisdiction ‘obligatory only in
appropriate cases,’” Mississippi, 506 US at 76
(quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 US
91, 93 (1972)), and therefore “as providing [the
Court] ‘with substantial discretion to make
case-by-case judgments as to the practical
necessity of an original forum in this Court,’”
id. (quoting Texas v. New Mexico, 462 US 554,
570 (1983)).
Supreme Court Practice §10.2, at 622 (collecting
cases).
Virginia v. Maryland, 540 US 56 (2003).
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc, 138 SCt 2080 (2018).
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